In my experience, English has not been neglected in Hungary in the past decades
.
True, official education policy made Russian the compulsory first second
language up to the late 1980s, but it was also compulsory to learn another
second language from high school on.  For that, the popular choice was either
German or English: German with a declining popularity and English with
an increasing one.  There were plenty of night courses offered by various
organizations too, again mostly German and English.

Since the change of systems, the predominance of German and English (not
necessarily in that order, but very close) has be firmly established.
German has seen a revival, reflecting Hungary's renewed German orientation
after a hiatus of 45 years, but English is anything but neglected these
days.

As for the use of English words in Hungarian, it is hardly surprising given
the worldwide dominance of English in emerging fields of knowledge.
Naturally, the new terms are carried into other languages in their originals
and then either left unchanged or assimilated to a lesser or greater extent.
First it may be just a spelling change to comply with the host language's
rules (e.g., file changed into fa'jl in Hungarian) or even replaced with
a native word/expression (click the mouse replaced with ra'kattint az
ege'rrel).

In Hungary there has been much effort to create Hungarian alternatives for
English computer terminology.  I haven't got a copy of the Hungarian version
of Windows but I understand that its labels are mainly in Hungarian and it
contains cases of quite ingenious Hungarization of English terms, well
beyond slavish translations.

As for Peter Soltesz's latest list of words, the majority of them came to
Hungary from languages other than English.  It is a safe bet that those
of Latin origin came straight from Latin, the Greek ones through Latin,
while older technical terms as akkumulator and reflektor from German.

George Antony

Just to keep up with the forwarded discussion of the "10 Untaught Lessons"
from the Habsburg list.

Hugh Agnew

----------------------------Original message----------------------------
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 1996 11:31:29 -0400 (EDT)
From: Mills Kelly >

I want to begin my response by thanking Charlie Ingrao for providing such
a thought-provoking discussion piece and for providing me with an
excellent teaching tool for my course "The Life and Death of Yugoslavia."
Charlie's essay and Gale Stokes' and Istvan Deak's responses set off an
animated yet informed discussion in an already lively undergraduate
seminar.  My own contribution to the dialogue on the ten lessons Charlie
proposes falls into two categories:

I.    National Self-Identification and the Future Leaders of East Central
      Europe

As tempting as it may be to wish for a new multinational state in East
Central Europe, there is a more immediate problem that must be overcome.
Certainly one can make a case for a new, larger state in the region when
grand historical trends, great power relations or macroeconomic
indicators are the issues in question.  However, when we descend to the
level of the individual we find a much more intractable problem that must
be dealt with before any such entity can be considered.  That problem is
the question of national self-identification.

Whatever we might think of nationalism as an ideology, it is hard to deny
that the idea of the nation has been incredibly compelling.  When you
speak to people in the region it becomes abundantly clear that with few
exceptions they understand themselves to be members of a nation first, and
then only secondarily citizens of a state, adherants to a religion, or,
even less likely "Europeans."  This national self-identification is very
strong among the young people of East Central Europe.  While many hope
that their state will find a way to rise above the national tensions
created by minorities or border controversies, few question their
nationality.  It is simply part of who they are and unlike many of us in
the "West", they do not make the causal relationship between having a
strong sense of nation and unpleasant consequences.

I can offer a simple example of the pervasiveness of this way of thinking
from my own experience teaching in Slovakia.  During a course on
nationalism and politics that I taught at the university in Presov, I gave
a lecture about constitutional protections of minority rights in
post-communist states.  One student became particularly vehement on the
question of language rights.  "After all," she said, "This is _our_
country [meaning the Slovaks] and so if they [meaning the Hungarians] want
to live here, they should speak _our_ language."  Her arguments did not
bring any wagging of heads, or clucking of tongues by the other 40 or so
students there.  Instead, there was much appreciation for her stance among
this group of future government officials, teachers and leaders of Slovak
society, only a few of whom would admit to being "nationalists."

So long as the young people of East Central Europe feel strongly that
their countries are "ours" and not "all of ours" it seems unrealistic to
hope that in the near term some sort of multinational confederation will
be workable.  Instead of trying to convince these future leaders to be
less national or that they ought to work to resurrect the good parts of
what to them is the ancient past (today's first-year university students
were, after all, only 11 when the Communist system collapsed) we need to
work with them to devise new solutions that address their most pressing
concerns.


II.   The Problem of Security

In lesson 9 Charlie writes that "without justice there can be no long term
stability."  Unfortunately, large majorities in East Central Europe
believe that _both_ the past and the present teach them that the only way
they can be secure in their culture, their economic life, and their
physical beings is in their own national state.  Charlie is correct when
he writes elsewhere in his essay that nationally-minded historians and
politicians have served up a potent mix of fact and myth to convince their
people of this.  Sadly, there is much truth in what they teach.  After
all, for every positive example that one of us could cite of a beneficial
aspect of being part of the Habsburg Monarchy, we could also find at least
one, if not several negative examples to counterbalance each positive one.
Thus, the peoples of East Central Europe who found themselves as the
lesser partners in multinational or binational states have little to work
with in trying to convince themselves to return to such a state of
affairs.

For this reason I would argue that where we in the "West" might desire a
multinational entity constructed on logical, rational principles that
accord with our sense of order and citizenship, these wishes do not
correspond to the experience of the people we hope would benefit.  Charlie
writes that the decision of the Slovak political leaders to take their
state out of the Czechoslovak federation was "a supremely illogical
choice," but according to whom?  Not according to the Slovaks who see
their economy defying all predictions of its collapse after separation
from the more developed Czech lands.  Not according to Slovaks who no
longer have to confront the fact that while they learned Czech, few Czechs
bothered to learn Slovak.  Not according to Slovaks who, as much as they
lament the state of their political culture, know that it is _their_
political culture.  We look at a state with less than 6 million
inhabitants, a severe minority problem and a political system riven by
factionalism, patronage and the worst kind of dirty tricks and shake our
heads wondering how such a state can hope to survive in a dangerous world.
But the fact is that large segments of Slovak society feel more secure
living under a constitution that begins with the words _My, narod
slovensky_, even with all the challenges they face.  Thus, just as in my
first point, it seems that the challenge is to build solutions to the
problems of the region that accommodate, rather than attempt to minimize
the nationalism of the peoples of the region.  Only then do all of us have
a chance to arrive at a lasting solution.

Mills Kelly
Department of History
University of New Hampshire

----------------------------Original message----------------------------
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 14:26:02 -0500 (CDT)
From: GARY W. SHANAFELT >

I much enjoyed Solomon Wank's observations on the state of the Habsburg
Monarchy in its last decade of existence as well as Jeremy King's reply.
As far as Germans controlling Cisleithania, I have to agree with Wank
(though admittedly I enjoyed King's exposition so much I would like to
provoke him into providing some more!) While German control was never as
complete as that of the Magyars in Hungary, and German nationalists from
Schoenerer to the Nationalverband complained about their lack of
sufficient authority vis-a-vis the other Cisleithanian nationalities, it
seems to me the bottom line is that no regime in Vienna could govern very
long _against_ the Austrian Germans without risking a political debacle,
and few even tried.  The Badeni language ordinances ought to be a
sufficient case in point.  Czech or Italian or Slovene wishes might be
ignored without paying too high a political price, but not German.

   Imperial Germany certainly saw its Austrian ally as a German state; the
(East) German Historian Fritz Klein has done some interesting research on
how, when Austrian governments seemed interested in pursuing domestic
policies that were not sufficiently German-oriented, Berlin was ready to
intervene behind the scenes to pressure them to change their orientation.
That situation only increased during World War I, when Germany's leverage
on the Monarchy vastly expanded, further buttressing the German groups
within Cisleithania and their ability to block any changes that might
imperil their privileged position.  Indeed, by the end of the war, the
Vienna government had finally decided on splitting Bohemia into German and
Czech areas -- a longstanding German Austrian demand but one consistently
opposed by the Bohemian Czechs as violating the unity of the Bohemian
Crown (_Boehmisches Staatsrecht_).  Though German prominence wasn't
written into law, it was as central to the political character of
Cisleithania as a white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant character was to the
United States (at least until the election of a Catholic president in
1960).  [See Gary W. Shanafelt, _The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and
the German Alliance, 1914-1918_ (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1985)
--Ed.]

  I would agree that German power in Cisleithania was certainly far less
than Magyar power in Hungary, and that some Cisleithanian nationalities
had more political clout than others -- particularly the Poles, who could
block governments almost as effectively as the Germans -- but when all is
said and done, the Germans were clearly number one; and if you wanted a
high position in the administration, army, or just about any position
beyond the local level, you had to be fluent in German and probably
possess many of the cultural values of the Germans as well.

  Finally, was the Monarchy dysfunctional, as Wank says?  I'm inclined to
say that it was until I look at our own political system -- at which point
dysfunctionality becomes a very relative term.

Gary Shanafelt
McMurry University

Prof. Ingrao, the original author of the "10 Untaught Lessons", replied
to some of the discussion they provoked.  I'm forwarding it from the
Hasbsburg discussion list.

Sincerely,

Hugh Agnew
----------------------------Original message----------------------------
Date: Thu, 03 Oct 96 22:25:08 EST
From: Charles Ingrao >

I would like to thank Jim Niessen for the typically thorough job that he
did in laying the groundwork for the forum on the "Ten Untaught Lessons
about Central Europe: a Historical Perspective".  Much of the work that he
does for HABSBURG is not readily apparent to users, but it is quite
evident to those of us who work with him on a regular basis.  I would also
like to thank the numerous respondents, who include some of our field's
most eminent scholars, as well as several of the bright young minds that
have entered the field in recent years.

  One thing that has really surprised me about the responses has been the
significant number of misinterpretations of what I actually said in the
essay. This is especially unfortunate because some of the initial
responses appear to have influenced subsequent contributions from
individuals who may have not actually read the essay themselves.  Once I
have addressed these commentaries, I will turn to the many substantive
comments and criticisms that have been made in several of the responses.


A. MISINTERPRETATIIONS:

    1. I was really taken aback by Gale Stokes' lengthy critique
(subsequently echoed by Helen Liebel-Weckowicz) of my supposed

    contention that the West, particularly the United States, can somehow
    impose a multiethnic solution in Eastern Europe [which] not only flies
    in the face of the current fate of the Dayton Accords, but is inconsistent
    with the principles of democracy, freedom, and self-determination that he
    presumably favors.

Perhaps Professor Stokes would like to point to the place in the text
where I actually make such a statement.  In reality, the *only* thing that
I say that we should "impose" is the letter of the Dayton Accords, which
mandate the convening of war crimes trials and the right of refugees to
return to the homes from which they were expelled -- and the imposition of
economic sanctions on any state which fails to comply.  Far from
advocating American intervention, I state rather emphatically in Lesson #9
that we should,

   launch a public dialogue throughout the region, daring (but not compelling)
   its people both to rediscover the forgotten benefits of their multinational
   past and to confront what nationalism has cost them in external security,
   economic prosperity, and domestic peace.  At the very least, it would also
   reassure and reacquaint the Serbs of Bosnia and Croatia with their long
   history of ethnic coexistence and collaboration.  But such a discussion
   would also temper the misperceptions of past persecution that have so
   poisoned relations between the peoples of the entire region.

I am truly at a loss to see how Professor Stokes can construe my notion of
our "daring (but not compelling)" a "public dialogue" as the forceful
imposition of anything.  Perhaps he will reexamine the text and confirm
that I don't expect the USA to impose anything except the letter of Peace
Accords that we signed, but continue to ignore, despite massive violations
by the Serbs.

  Since Professor Stokes is under the mistaken impression that I advocate
US intervention, he spends considerable energy disputing "why the United
States, in particular, should be responsible for Central Europe." But,
once again, I never called for American or other outside imposition of a
multiethnic solution to the region's problems, just a "public dialogue"
that might counteract 75 years of strident nationalist rhetoric.


   2. I'm afraid that Professor Stokes also appears to have misunderstood
my position about the emerging European Union when he states that,

   a third problem with Ingrao's proposals -- they completely ignore the
   successful multinational community that actually exists in Europe today,
   the European Union.

Professor Stokes's remarks subsequently found an echo in Solomon Wank, who
erroneously claimed that "Ingrao does not mention the European Union...."
I would direct Professors Stokes and Wank to Lesson #9, in which I contend
that a multinational state,

   would also offer a realistic interim solution to the region's economic
   goals.  Few Central European leaders have publicly admitted that their
   economies are decades away from attaining full integration with the
   European Union.  Yet until they achieve that dream, their countries'
   exports will continue to be frustrated by trade barriers that the EU
   has routinely erected to protect its own producers.  The expanded free
   trade zone created by a multinational state could shorten the wait for
   admission by accelerating the commercial integration already begun by
   more modest intraregional consortia like the Visegrad Group and the
   Septagonale.

I would have hoped that Professors Stokes and Wank would have interpreted
my assertion that a multinational combination "could shorten the wait for
admission" to the EU as an indication that I, too, am an advocate of the
region's ultimate integration into the EU -- and that I advocate
multinational cooperation as an interim solution that might reduce the
wait for entry. Hence my disappointment that he ignores that and my
argument that, alas, entrance into the EU for several states (like
Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia) is presently a very long
way off.  Even a much more economically advanced country like Hungary has
just acknowledged that it will not be able to enter the EU before 2002!  I
would invite Professors Stokes and Wank to estimate how long it might take
for "backet cases" like Albania or Macedonia to join the EU under current
conditions; my contention is that a confederation with Bulgaria would
greatly reduce their isolation from international markets and afford them
the kind of commercial and investment opportunities that would shorten the
wait for EU membership.

   3. Another misinterpretation of the text of my essay comes from Claire
Nolte, Solomon Wank and Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric, who feel that little can
be learned from the Habsburg experience because the monarchy was a
supranational state based on dynasticism, rather than a multiethnic
dynamic.  I am not surprised that Professor Wank envisioned my essay as an
attempt to apply Habsburg political models, since this is the frame of
reference that he assumes in his forthcoming _AHY_ article, which
systematically assaults the flawed political structure of the Dual
Monarchy (1867-1918).  I totally agree with Professors Nolte, Wank and
Milojkovic-Djuric that there is literally nothing to be gained from
studying the supranational, dynastic ethic that drove the monarchy in its
last half-century.  But I am not suggesting that we study the monarchy's
dynastic superstructure or emulate the unfortunate resort to Dualism
(sorry Istvan!).  Rather, I'd like to see us learn from the Habsburg
experience by focusing our attention on the rich variety of experiences of
the Habsburg peoples at the local and regional level, where many priceless
lessons that can be drawn from the way people interacted within the
various matrices of bi- and multinational communities.  I am sure that
Professors Nolte, Wank and Milojkovic-Djuric would agree with me on that!

> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-

Tomorrow I will transmit the second part of my reply, which deals with several
excellent insights contributed by the respondents to my original essay.

Dear Janos (Zsargo):
My intent here was primarily to focus on fun.
Many Hungarians have no idea that they are in fact speaking
a forms of Aglocized Latin/German/etc. (after all English is quite
a mix). I was hoping to alert the Hungarians that they KNOW
more English than they think!
Peter Soltesz

Again, a forward from the Habsburg discussion list.

Sincerely,

Hugh Agnew

----------------------------Original message----------------------------
This is the second part of Charlie Ingrao's response to the forum on his
essay "Ten Untaught Lessons about Central Europe."


Date: Fri, 04 Oct 1996 16:18:11 -0500 (EST)
From: Charles Ingrao >


B. Substantive Insights

        1. The Chimera of Multinational Entities

Gale Stokes is quite correct when he writes that I put my "ideas forward
less as practical guide for public policy than as what [I hope] will be
the beginning of a public dialogue on the fate of Central Europe."  After
all, in politics there is always a gap between what is ideal and what is
possible. Thus, he grasps the very essence of the problem when he suggests
that I yearn that "somehow the Central European toothpaste can be squeezed
back into the Habsburg tube" and that, more specifically, "the time when a
multiethnic Bosnia can be sustained is over."  His pessimism was echoed by
several correspondents, including Istvan Deak ("the movement toward
national entities was and remains unstoppable"), Helen Liebel-Weckowicz
("Short of brutal conquests, hardly any of the Balkans peoples would
willingly accept another multi-national empire."), and T. Mills Kelly, who
vividly describes the much "more intractable problem" [of] national
self-identification" at the individual level, which leads the members of
dominant ethnic groups to adopt a proprietary perspective toward their
nation-states.

  Of course, I expressed the same pessimism when I wrote in my essay that,

    realistically speaking, the obstacles [against the creation of
    multinational states] are almost certainly insurmountable. Seventy-five
    years of state-building by the region's "successor states" and radical
    changes in its ethnic demography have created a seemingly irresistible
    momentum for the creation of nation-states like the *dozen* new entities
    of the past five years.

But I am not yet ready to say that it would be impossible.  Admittedly, my
rather muted optimism is informed by others more eminently qualified than
I (most notably C.A. Macartney, Misha Glenny, and State Department
officials who persist in their efforts to preserve a multiethnic Bosnia).
But it is also emboldened by my faith in the power of media to mold
popular culture.  The region's culture presently reflects monopolization
of all forms of media by the successor states of 1919 and 1989.  My
reading of the dynamics of political culture persuades me that at some
point, some of these peoples will feel sufficiently self-confident about
themselves and their nation that they will be able to reexamine their
multinational past without clinging to the myths of oppression and
conflict that are the common currency of in the legitimation strategies of
new nations.  Nancy Wingfield's commentary suggested that the Czechs are
already feeling sufficiently secure about themselves to venture into such
a discussion. I am suggesting that the West dare the region's leaders to
open a public dialogue *now* that dares them to recognize the essential
compatibility of multinationalism, not in order to recreate past, failed
regimes like Austria-Hungary, but to restore the socio-cultural ambience
that has enabled people to live peacefully in a multinational state as
late as 1989. If the Habsburg monarchy failed, it was largely because its
leaders never promoted a mass political culture based on the notion of a
multiethnic nation, thereby abandoning the field to the intrinsically
divisive forces of western-style nationalism; but obtuseness does not mean
that such an approach is impossible, only that it has never been given a
chance anywhere in Europe except Switzerland.  As my good friend Sol Wank
says, "nation-states are historically contingent phenomena; they will not
last forever."  As historians and social scientists, we can encourage our
leaders to help the process along.

  Before turning to the next substantive issue, let me dwell just a bit on
the two possibilities for multinational association that I proposed
though, admittedly, I did so partly to provoke and exercise my HABSBURG
colleagues.  A northern confederation of Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary,
Slovakia and Romania may not be politically feasible right now, given
Slovak and Romanian hostility toward Hungary, but recent developments
suggest that rapprochement is possible, especially once these nations have
had an opportunity to enjoy their newly found freedom and confront the
problems that come with Balkanization -- including Romania's and
Slovakia's likely long-term exclusion from the EU.  At the very least, a
confederation of Bosnia and Croatia would seem inevitable if the Bosnian
Serbs secede from the ungainly state that Dayton created; sadly, such a
confederation would be binational, rather than multinational.

  And please do let me say a few nice things about those unloved
"leftovers" -- Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania -- whom Istvan Deak
indelicately labels "Europe's three worst basket cases" (Really, Istvan!).
The fact that they *are* basket cases constitutes one of the very reasons
for bringing them together.  A tripartite confederation would offer
compelling advantages for all three.  Macedonia would finally gain
commercial access to the outside world; Macedonia and Albania would
acquire meaningful security against their hostile Greek and Yugoslav
neighbors; for the first time since the Roman era, Albania would have
meaningful commercial ties with the Balkan hinterland; in Albania the
"oppressed" Moslem minorities of Macedonia and Bulgaria would gain an
advocate; and Bulgaria would be able realize its century-long dream,
turned nightmare, of union with Macedonia.


        2. The Drawbacks of Multinational States

A central feature of the "Ten Untaught Lessons" is its faith in the
greater efficacy of multinational societies, especially when compared to
binational entities in which a dominant group practices the "tyranny of
the majority". I am disappointed that my faith has found no echo among the
correspondents.

  Nicholas Miller judges the advocacy of a balance of power that is
intrinsic to most multinational societies to be "a negative approach to
ending the rivalries of the region [which] does not work in the long run."
I don't deem the creation of such a balance to be a "negative" when it has
-- on balance -- a positive impact.  Perhaps it is the New Yorker in me,
but I have met too many denizens of multiethnic communities from around
the world to ignore the way in which such a balance liberates people from
fear and loathing.  Yes, even they are prone to some degree of ethnic bias
and will occasionally resort to ethnic slurs in characterizing their
neighbors, but this is a small price to pay when compared to the
alternative through which the region's peoples have suffered.

  Whereas I have cited ethnic interaction within the Habsburg monarchy as
evidence of the efficacy of multiethnicity, I have never suggested that
Austria-Hungary necessarily represented an ideal solution to the region's
multiethnic demography.  But I do maintain that the old monarchy "was far
from dysfunctional" -- meaning that it did offer many advantages to its
citizens -- in contrast to Sol Wank, who argues that it was, in fact,
dysfunctional. Surely Sol would agree that virtually *every* country is to
some extent both functional and dysfunctional; hence I take his assessment
to mean that he feels that its drawbacks outweighed its contributions to
the quality of life of its people.  But, since Sol and other respondents
choose to dwell on what is "possible" (and "impossible") in solving the
region's problems, I would invite them to tell me how any political entity
could have done a better job of it than the Habsburg monarchy.

  I must, in fact, disagree with T. Mills Kelly's claim that "for every
positive example that one of us could cite of a beneficial aspect of being
part of the Habsburg Monarchy, we could also find at least one, if not
several, negative examples to counterbalance each positive one."  When I
compare its achievements in providing relatively high levels of economic
growth, living standards, education, legal equality, public order, social
services, democratization, professionalization, and artistic culture with
the regions to the immediate north, south and east, I can only conclude
that the monarchy's peoples were better off for the experience.  The
balance of achievements was better in the Austrian half of the monarchy
because -- as Jeremy King points out in his retort to Sol Wank -- it was
*not* dominated by the Germans, but rather enjoyed a real balance of its
component ethnic groups.

  If the quality of life in Cisleithania was better than in Hungary, it
was also much, much, much better in Habsburg Bosnia than in any of the
Balkan nation states.  Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric's response focuses on the
failings of Habsburg rule in Bosnia, principally its unfortunate failure
to carry out land reform.  First of all, let me say that I am delighted to
have Dr. Milojkovic-Djuric as a member of the HABSBURG Discussion Group,
which enriches our discourse by including a colleague who was actually
born in Yugoslavia and educated in Belgrade.  But I must repeat my earlier
cautionary about judging any state by dwelling exclusively on its
shortcomings.  Whereas I don't doubt her claim that the Habsburgs raised
taxes (though they spent far more of the monarchy's money in Bosnia than
they raised there), spent a lot of it building a museum that "served as a
visible vehicle of propaganda" (together with other cultural and
educational institutions, many of which the Bosnian Serbs have since
destroyed), and suppressed the pro-Ottoman resistance in the years
immediately after its occupation, I share the more balanced judgment of
those recent scholarly works (books by Noel Malcolm, Mark Pinson, John
Fine Donia and Robert Donia, and an AHY article by M. Palairet) that judge
Habsburg rule to have been far more positive than negative.  As those
scholars point out, Bosnia's infrastructure, literacy levels, and standard
of living increased so dramatically after 1878 that they far exceeded
those of other Balkan countries, including Serbia and Montenegro.


        3. Misinformed Americans ?

I accept Istvan Deak's corrective that America's negotiators were fairly
well-informed when they headed to Paris in 1919 and that the trouble was that
they were rendered

    powerless by domestic considerations as well as by the selfishness,
    shortsightedness, and imperialistic ambitions of the French after the
    First World War, and the similar follies of the Soviet Union after
    the Second World War. Nor should we forget how the British and French
    political delegates and military commanders scuttled every move in
    recent times aimed at stopping Serbian aggression in Bosnia. At last,
    very late in the game, a US president had the political courage to
    order a few air attacks, which stopped the war, at least for the time
    being.

But, whereas Istvan is right about our top policy makers in 1919 and 1943, I
remain troubled by several episodes in the recent crisis, such as Bill
Clinton's announcement at a press conference that he finally understood what
was going on in Bosnia after having read Robert Kaplan's _Balkan Ghosts_; or
the American diplomats who congratulated Peter Sugar on a "brilliant" lecture
that had cast the Bosnian crisis in a new light (even though what he said has
been widely available in undergraduate textbooks for years); or the several
Congressmen who could not find Bosnia on a map of Europe (one of them claiming
that he didn't have his glasses with him); or in our leaders' pathetically
naive faith in the countless promises that Serb leaders have made, only to
break them at the first opportunity.


Charles Ingrao
Purdue University

On Tue, 8 Oct 1996, S or G Farkas wrote:
<SNIP>. So what? What is
> the relationship between this and all the other stuff about the schools
> where they supposedly teach children to do this and that?
>
Well perhaps one should also look at what Dr. Elders (our disgraced
former official) was in school yesterday in Maryland (I think) still
being a public proponent of teaching masturbation and other sexual act to
ALL school children!   This is one example of the degenerate thinking that
can and does go on in schools and government!

If you bothered to listen...you may find many such atach=ks on the standards
by which most Americans live by and try to adhere to.

Peter Soltesz

On Tue, 8 Oct 1996, S or G Farkas wrote:

> According to tomorrow's Nepszabadsag there are 30,000 homeless in Hungary.
> This corresponds 750,000 in the US (proportionally), a number close to the
> real numbers (according to some). Here is an area where, sadly, Hungary
> caught up with the US.
>
> Gabor D. Farkas
<<<<<<< It is probably significantly more than that! The last time I was
in BP and elsewhere in the country, I was quite amazed at the number of
homeless, beggars, and despondent people both on the street, in the
metro, etc.   It is a shame that democracy (and people in general) have
not found a good solution to this problem. Under the communists these
people were "hidden" away. One clear thing tough, in HU at least one
solution was to give these people a job, no matter how low level, that
still allowed them to maintain some form of self-esteem -- namely they
earned some money.  In the US the free dole causes people to lose all
self-esteem and develop an expectation, later a demand, later claim a
right to free dole! Both sides are wrong. There must be a better workable
solution!
Peter Soltesz>

In article >,
 says...
>
>Yeah, America is amazing! And I just love it.
>
I am glad you have discovered America.  However, re the gulag, I strongly
recommend you read Alexander Solczenitsyn.  THe most interesting thing in
his books is that the people suffering in the gulags and stalinists
prisons are strongly believing in the communist ideology - to the end of
their life.  They think it is all a big mistake that they were arrested.
They think there are bad people, the the idea is great.

Agnes
>I sang the world famous American song, Amazing Grace, together with
thousands
>of people in the weekend. Everybody was so happy that it is hard to
express.
>This is the real American spirit, the spirit of freedom and love.In my
opinion
>this is the best American song ever written. (Everybody knows the musics
of
>this song in Hungary too, but they don't know the words. They don't
know, that
>it is a beautiful Christian song. Why? Because you sell them America
without
>the real content, without the real American spirit, which is so
intimately
>related with God through love.)
>
>  "I once was lost
>   Now am free,
>   Was blind
>   But, now I see."
>
>In his weekend sermon Father Kennedy spoke about the "new kind of men",
a
>fabrication of the communists by their utterly atheistic and antihuman
>philosophy. This kind of "new man" was completely revealed in the guards
of
>the GULAG. He spoke about the "unspeakable sufferings" e.g. woman
prisoners
>had to endure in GULAG at the hands of these guards. Their acts were the
acts
>of the cruelest kind of men in the history of the mankind. (You may also
read